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Two cases' decided during the past term presented an inter-
esting question of the constitutionality of the venue provisions
in a statute. In both, the plaintiff citizens and taxpayers sought
to enjoin the continued operation of alleged gambling houses as
an abatement of public nuisances, under the gambling abatement
statute.2 In each case, the defendants challenged the jurisdic-
tion of the court, pleading that the amended statute under which
the suit was brought violated the due process clauses of the Fed-
eral and State Constitutions and the constitutional provisions
dividing the state into judicial districts. Specifically, the juris-
dictional challenge stemmed from the failure of the legislature,
in amending the statute, to include the phrase "having jurisdic-
tion thereof" after the words "any district court"; and it was
contended that this evidenced a legislative intent to vest juris-
diction in this type of case in any district court of the state, in
violation of the constitutional provisions invoked. Pointing
out that the last amendment had merely tracked the language
of the original legislation, which had been broadened in an
earlier amendment, the majority of the court, held that the
words "any district court" in the latest amendment meant any
district court having personal jurisdiction over the defendants,
and that since the latter were all sued at their domicile this
requirement had been met. Three justices concurred in the re-
sult, but predicated their opinion on a recognition of a legislative
intent to confer jurisdiction in such cases upon any district court,
but a failure to find therein any violation of the constitutional
provisions invoked.
Amendment of Petition
Despite the continuous progress made during the past fifteen
years towards liberality of amendment of pleadings in Louisiana,
thus far the cases prohibiting amendment in the field of conserva-
tory writs3 have escaped overruling. The technical position taken
*Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Tanner v. Beverly Country Club, Ellzey v. Original Club Forest, 214
La. 791, 38 So. (2d) 783 (1948).
2. La. Act 192 of 1920, as amended by La. Act 49 of 1938 and La. Act
120 of 1940.
3. Rhodes v. Union Bank of Louisiana, 7 Rob. 63 (La. 1844) (injunction);
Kelly & Frazer v. Bentley, 9 La. Ann. 586 (1854) (attachment); ad Terzia
v. Grand Leader, 176 La. 151, 145 So. 363 (1933) (provisional seizure).
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by the courts in these conservatory writ cases in the past has
been based on the theory that an amendment can never be per-
mitted to relate back to the time of filing the original petition,
and hence never can be given any curative effect, when filed
after the defendant has excepted to the original petition or moved
to dissolve the writ. Since the rationale of these earlier cases
has now been repudiated,4 and as the supreme court in its latest
decision on the subject has relaxed the strict rules of pleading
heretofore applied in conservatory writ cases, 5 the overruling of
these earlier decisions is to be anticipated.
An opportunity for such constructive work was presented
in Melerine v. Melerine.6 In the lower court, plaintiff sued her
husband for a separation from bed and board and for injunctive
relief to prevent the defendant from disposing of the community
property. The petition's prayer, inter alia, asked for an injunc-
tion and for judgment perpetuating the same. Attached to the
petition was an order drafted by plaintiff's counsel, and signed
in due course by the trial judge, for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a rule upon defendant to show cause why
a permanent injunction should not issue. Defendant excepted to
the petition on the ground that it disclosed no cause of action for
injunctive relief, since a permanent injunction could not issue
upon rule and plaintiff had not prayed for a preliminary injunc-
tion. On the trial of the exception, the temporary restraining
order previously issued was recalled and the rule for a perma-
nent injunction was dismissed. Plaintiff's request for permission
to amend the petition so as to cure the defects complained of
was refused.
Under its supervisory jurisdiction, the supreme court set
aside all of the trial judge's rulings. In the opinion it was pointed
out that here the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction as of
right, and that the defendant's exception was not directed to the
petition, but rather to the defective order signed by the trial
judge, which was exclusively the latter's responsibility. It is
unfortunate that the court did not see fit to decide the case on
the broader ground that a petition in a conservatory writ case
may be amended as in ordinary suits.
4. In Reeves v. Globe Indemnity Co. of New York, 185 La. 42, 168 So.
488 (1936).
5. Cf. West v. Ray, 210 La. 25, 26 So. (2d) 221 (1946), noted in (1947) 7
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 433.
6. 214 La. 279, 37 So. (2d) 600 (1948).
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Exceptions
The harvest reaped each term in jurisprudence on the pro-
cedural exceptions usually is a bountiful one. Last term's crop
was relatively small, with even the few cases on the subject
singularly free from difficulity.
In Slattery Company v. F. W. Woolworth Company,7 plain-
tiff sought to cancel an extension of a commercial lease which
was allegedly in consideration of valuable alterations and im-
provements to be made on the leased premises by lessee. Plain-
tiff's action was based on two different grounds: firstly, on the
theory that the agreement was void as containing a potestative
agreement, since the lessee was under no obligation to make the
alterations and improvements; and secondly, on the ground that
the lessee was obligated to make the alterations and improve-
ments, and that the agreement had been breached because of
his failure to do so. The trial court, finding that these two incon-
sistent causes of action had not been pleaded in the alternative,
sustained an exception of no cause of action thereto and dis-
missed the suit. On appeal, the inconsistencies of the two actions
was recognized, but the judgment of the trial court was re-
versed and the cause remanded with instructions to the trial
court to require plaintiff to elect as to which of the two incon-
sistent actions it would continue to prosecute. The position of
the appellate court is clearly supported by the pertinent code
provision on the subject.8
The plaintiff owner of a commercial garage, in Douglas v.
Haro,9 sought to recover the damages sustained by a patron's car
from a collision with an auto owned and operated by the defen-
dant. The petition contained the usual allegations with respect
to this damage having been caused by defendant's negligence.
Both the trial and the intermediate appellate court had sustained
defendant's exceptions of no right and no cause of action and
had dismissed plaintiff's suit. The petition, attempting to show
plaintiff's responsibility as depositary, alleged that at the time
of the accident the patron's car was being operated by one of
plaintiff's employees, who had taken the auto from the garage
without permission. The theory on which both of these excep-
tions had been maintained was that the petition had failed to
allege any loss by plaintiff or demand for restitution by the
7. 214 La. 876, 39 So. (2d) 161 (1949).
8. Art. 152, La. Code of Practice of 1870. See also Bickman v. Carbajal,
166 La. 618, 117 So. 738 (1928).
9. 214 La. 1099, 39 So. (2d) 744 (1949).
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depositor. The supreme court refused to go into this question,
holding such a decision unnecessary, since in all events the
patron was an indispensable party to the litigation. The judg-
ments of the two lower courts were set aside, and the case was
remanded with instructions to require plaintiff to make the
patron a party litigant.
Dodge v. Bituminous Casualty Corporation0 again recog-
nized the settled rule that plaintiff's contributory negligence,
appearing from the allegations of the petition, might be raised
through an exception of no cause of action. But once again this
exception was overruled through the holding that for the excep-
tion to lie the allegations of the petition must leave no other
rational hypothesis available except contributory negligence of
the plaintiff. The court's actions in these respects appear unex-
ceptionable. Its refusal to hold the plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence under the evidence presented is much more difficult
to understand."
In another case,' 2 the court's decision was reached through
a sustaining of exceptions of no right and no cause of action,
involving only settled rules of pleadings and an elementary
principle of insurance law. Plaintiffs, suing as subrogees of the
insured owner of a building being constructed, brought suit to
recover of the contractor the amounts of insurance paid, alleging
that the defendant's negligence caused the destruction of the
building by fire. Since the policies in question were of the type
commonly known as "Builder's Risk Policies," made payable
to the owner and contractor as their interest might appear,
considerable ingenuity was shown by plaintiffs in alleging that
on the date of the fire the building had been occupied by and
belonged exclusively to the owner, and that the contractor had
no interest therein. Other allegations of the petition, however,
showed that at the time of the fire, the defendant contractor
and his employees were still working on the building in accord-
ance with the building contract. Under the latter allegations,
the court experienced no difficulty in holding that the defendant
contractor was still an insured under the policies, and hence
could not be held for his negligence or that of his employees.
The exception of res judicata was urged and overruled in
10. 214 La. 1031, 39 So. (2d) 720 (1949).
11. This case will be the subject of a note appearing in an early issue
of the LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
12. Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 214 La. 467, 38 So. (2d)
139 (1948).
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two cases decided during the past term. In both, the court again
had occasion to recognize the fact that our civilian rules appli-
cable to the thing adjudged are much narrower than those ob-
taining at common law.13 In Durmeyer v. Streiffer,14 it was held
that a judgment rendered against an improvement association
which sought to enforce certain building restrictions against de-
fendant was no bar to a subsequent suit by an individual owner
of adjacent property to enjoin continued violation of the same
restrictions. In Jones v. Williams,15 the court again applied the
civil law requirement that res judicata cannot be invoked unless
the two suits were between the same parties. A judgment ap-
proving a compromise settlement of a workmen's compensation
claim between an employee and his corporate employer was
held not to constitute any bar to a suit by the employee against
an individual alleged to have been an employer at the time of
the accident.
Appellate Jurisdiction
Probably the most interesting case in the field of civil pro-
cedure decided during the past term was Walker v. Fitzgerald.'6
So close a question of appellate jurisdiction was presented therein
that when the case was first appealed to a court of appeal the
latter transferred it to the supreme court; and when the cause
was considered in our highest court it was transferred back to
the intermediate appellate court.
In the trial court plaintiffs had sued to annul an agreement
granting defendant's assignor the right to extract sand and gravel
from certain land, contending that this agreement was void
as it contained a potestative condition. In the alternative, plain-
tiffs sought to recover of defendant $3,016 alleged to be due as
royalty on the sand extracted under the contract. Defendant
denied the nullity of the agreement, admitted that during the
life of the contract he had extracted a certain number of tons of
sand, but denied that any royalty for sand was due under the
terms of the agreement. During the trial, the parties stipulated
that the land subject to the contract had a value in excess of
$100 but less than $2,000. The supreme court further found that
13. Some of these differences are brought into bold relief in Hope v.
Madison, 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940). See also Comment: Res Judicata-
Matters Which Might Have Been Pleaded (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
347, 491.
14. 215 La. 585, 41 So.(2d) 226 (1949).
15. 215 La. 1, 39 So. (2d) 746 (1949).
16. 214 La. 293, 37 So. (2d) 712 (1948),
1950]
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"by plaintiffs' tacit concession" prior to submission of the cause
to the trial court, the alternative demand for $3,016 had been
reduced to $1,680. Judgment was rendered in the trial court re-
jecting plaintiffs' primary demand for the annulment of the
contract, but awarding plaintiffs $1,680 as royalty for the sand
extracted by defendant. The latter appealed to the court of
appeal, and there plaintiffs answered the appeal, praying for
the maintenance of their primary demand.
On its own motion, the intermediate appellate court ques-
tioned its jurisdiction over the case. Pointing out that since very
considerable amounts of gravel and sand had been extracted
under the agreement during the first four years of its existence,
and that the loss which the defendant would sustain if the con-
tract were avoided would be considerably more than $2,000,
the cause was transferred to the supreme court.17 The latter in
turn considered the question of its appellate jurisdiction. Point-
ing out that the demand for royalty had been reduced to $1,680
prior to the submission of the case in the trial court, and by stipu-
lation the land was worth less than $2,000, it was concluded that
the amount involved in both of plaintiffs' demands was below
the jurisdiction of the supreme court, and the cause was trans-
ferred back to the court of appeal. The highest court of the
state refused to consider the value of the gravel and sand ex-
tracted from the land during prior operations under the contract.
Walker v. Fitzgerald brings into bold relief one of the most
perplexing problems of appellate jurisdiction-the determina-
tion of the "amount involved." Usually, the possible gain to the
plaintiff is exactly equal to the possible loss of the defendant.
But this does not always follow, as there may be cases where
the ultimate cost or loss to the defendant in the event of an
adverse decision would far exceed the plaintiff's gain from a
judgment in his favor.' In such cases, the supreme court has
applied the "defendant's viewpoint theory."' 8 This was the rule
which the court of appeal attempted to apply in its conjectures
17. 24 So. (2d) 263 (La. App. 1946).
18. In this connection, see the tests of appellate jurisdiction applied
in the following cases: State ex rel. Chandler v. City of Shreveport, 151
La. 491, 91 So. 850 (1922)-cost to defendant of complying with a mandamus
prayed for by plaintiff; Murff v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 180 La.
664, 157 So. 383 (1934)-cost to defendant of complying with a mandatory
injunction sought by plaintiff; Frierson v. Cooper, 196 La. 450, 199 So. 388
(1940), noted in (1941) 1 Loyola L. Rev. 110-loss which defendant would
sustain if injunction sought by plaintiff were granted: New Orleans & North-
eastern R. Co. v. Redmann, 210 La. 525, 27 So. (2d) 321 (1946)-value of dis-
puted strip plus cost to defendant of removing therefrom junk stored
thereon.
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as to the value of the contractual rights of which the defendant
would be deprived by an adverse decision. Looking only to the
maximum gain to the plaintiffs from each of their alternative
demands, the supreme court concluded that it lacked appellate
jurisdiction over the cause. In view of the basic rule that the
appellate court's jurisdiction must appear affirmatively from the
record, the supreme court's decision certainly is subject to no
criticism. There appeared to be nothing in the transcript which
established definitely and affirmatively the value to the defen-
dant of the contract rights involved.
The failure of the record to establish affirmatively the appel-
late jurisdiction of the supreme court resulted in its transfer of
another cause 19 to the intermediate appellate court. Defendant
had appealed from a judgment of the trial court restraining him
from the continued violation of certain building restrictions. In
yet another case,20 the record affirmatively established the su-
preme court's lack of appellate jurisdiction. These were succes-
sion proceedings, where the issue presented was whether certain
real estate purchased in the name of the decedent, and inven-
toried in the proceedings at $3,500, was community or separate
property. Since only a half interest in the property was in dis-
pute, the court of appeal clearly had appellate jurisdiction.
State ex rel. Chehardy v. New Orleans Parkway Commis-
sion21 illustrates the proper procedure to be followed by an appel-
late court when the appeal presents a plurality of points or de-
mands, only some of which are within the particular court's juris-
diction. Here, relator instituted proceedings in the court below
for mandamus to compel defendant commission to issue relator
a permit to remove certain trees, or in the alternative for a judg-
ment decreeing the ordinance creating the defendant commis-
sion unconstitutional. From a judgment granting the alterna-
tive relief and further ordering defendant commission to issue
the permit, the defendant appealed. In the supreme court, the
defendant abandoned any issue of the constitutionality of the
ordinance, thus conceding tacitly the correctness of the judgment
appealed from in this respect. Since this was the only point in
the case over which the supreme court had appellate jurisdiction,
the cause was transferred to the court of appeal. There is author-
19. Plauche v. Albert, 215 La. 776, 41 So. (2d) 677 (1949).
20. Succession of Valdez; Succession of Bianchi, 215 La. 791, 41 So. (2d)
682 (1949).
21. 215 La. 779, 41 So. (2d) 678 (1949).
1950]
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ity for this procedure; 22 but in the past the failure of our appel-
late courts to transfer the cause after acting upon the only point
or demand over which it had jurisdiction, has sometimes pre-
vented any review of certain phases of the case. 23
In the remaining case24 within this subdivision, defendant
had appealed from a judgment rendered in favor of a wife and
her children, awarding them damages for illness alleged to have
been contracted, during severely cold weather, from the discon-
nection of a gas line from which plaintiffs' home was heated,
and damages for the embarrassment, inconvenience and hardship
sustained thereby. Since these demands were for damages for
physical injuries and "for other damages . . . arising from the
same circumstances," over which the court of appeal had ex-
clusive jurisdiction, the case was transferred to that court.
Appellate Procedure
Two appeals25 were dismissed by the supreme court on the
ground that only moot questions were presented for adjudica-
tion. In both, a devolutive appeal had been prosecuted from an
order of court authorizing the judicial sale of property, and prior
to a consideration of the appeal the property had been sold. Since
the validity of the judicial sales could not be affected by any
subsequent reversals of the judgments appealed from, both ap-
peals were dismissed.
In State ex rel. Lucas v. Hickey,26 the supreme court again
held that the Recorder of Mortgages for the Parish of Orleans
had a sufficient interest to appeal from a judgment of court
ordering him to erase from the records of his office the inscrip-
tion of a mortgage.
22. State v. J. Foto & Bro., 134 La. 154, 63 So. 859 (1913); Downs v. Dunn,
162 La. 747, 111 So. 82 (1927).
23. As where plaintiff has cumulated in his petition two separate de-
mands, one reviewable on appeal only by the supreme court, the other
appealable only to a court of appeal. In this connection, see Newsom v.
Starns, 174 La. 955, 142 So. 138 (1932); Applewhite v. New Orleans Great
Northern R. Co., 148 So. 261 (La. App. 1933); Searcy v. Interurban Transp.
Co., 171 So. 468 (La. App. 1937); Id., 179 So. 93 (La. App. 1937); and Id., 189
La. 183, 179 So. 75 (1938).
24. Sibley v. Petty Realty Co., 215 La. 597, 41 So. (2d) 230 (1949).
25. Walters v. Childers, 214 La. 531, 38 So. (2d) 160 (1948); State v. Mu-
tual Ins. Co., 214 La. 357, 37 So. (2d) 817 (1948).
26. 214 La. 711, 38 So. (2d) 395 (1949). The court distinguished the instant
case from Carrere v. Reddix, 211 La. 566, 30 So. (2d) 432 (1947), on the ground
that in the latter the appeal was not dismissed on motion but only after
a consideration of the merits, and the judgment appealed from therein
had not ordered the recorder to perform or to refrain from performing any
official act. The Reddix case is discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term (1948) 8 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 269.
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The old question of whose duty it is to -file the transcript of
appeal in the appellate court 27 came up again in the supreme
court for its annual consideration. In Manfre v. Corbello,28 de-
fendants sought to appeal to the Orleans Court of Appeal from
the judgment of a New Orleans city court ordering them to
vacate certain premises rented from the plaintiff under an oral
lease for a $15 monthly rental. The trial court had made the
appeal returnable on December 20, 1947, but the transcript of
appeal had been lodged in the appellate court on December 30th.
The trial judge's certificate indicated that the record was trans-
mitted to the court of appeal on December 18th. No where did
the record indicate why the transcript was not filed in the appel-
late court until twelve days thereafter. Concluding that this
delay must have been attributable to defendants, the court of
appeal sustained plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Under a writ of
review, the supreme court pointed out that the duty to file the
transcript of appeal with the appellate court in cases involving
less than $100 is upon the city court judge, rather than upon
appellant, and held that in such cases the appeal could not be
dismissed unless the delay was clearly due to negligence of the
appellant. As the record was completely silent on this point,
the cause was remanded to the court of appeal with instructions
to determine the facts, and to dismiss the appeal only if the delay
in filing the transcript was found to be due to the fault of appel-
lant.
The two remedial statutes protecting an appellant from a dis-
missal of the appeal because of deficiencies in the transcript 29
were invoked by the supreme court in two appeals. In one, 30
the missing portions of the transcript of appeal were supplied
by appellant immediately after appellee had moved to dismiss
the appeal; and since the deficiencies of the record had been
cured within the time allowed by the pertinent statute,3 1 the
motion was denied. In the other case,3 2 the transcript had been
prepared in accordance with the statute3 3 allowing counsel the
right to designate what portions of the record were to be sent
up to the appellate court. The supreme court again denied the
27. For the applicable rules, see Note (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 304 and
authorities discussed therein.
28. 215 La. 81, 39 So. (2d) 830 (1949).
29. La. Act 234 of 1932 and La. Act 229 of 1910, as amended by La. Act
265 of 1918.
30. Smith v. Atkins, 215 La. 310, 40 So. (2d) 475 (1949).
31. La. Act 234 of 1932.
32. Birdwell v. Birdwell, 214 La. 401, 37 So. (2d) 850 (1948).
33. La. Act 229 of 1910, as amended by La. Act 265 of 1918.
1950]
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motion to dismiss, holding that the remedy of the appellee who
complained of a defective transcript in such cases was either
to have the transcript supplemented or to point out the neces-
sity therefor so that the appellate court might direct appellant
to file a supplementary transcript.
The pertinent code provisions3 4 offer a choice of two reme-
dies to an appellee, when the appellant has failed to lodge the
transcript timely and there has been no extension of the return
day. The appellee may either lodge the transcript of appeal him-
self in the appellate court, so as to seek affirmance of the judg-
ment appealed from; or, upon producing in the trial court a cer-
tificatd of the abandonment of the appeal signed by the appel-
late court, the appellee may obtain execution of the judgment
appealed from. The code articles do not state precisely the man-
ner in which execution of the judgment may be so obtained.
In Barton v. Raziano,3 5 the appellee presented the certificate of
abandonment to a deputy clerk of the trial court, and the latter
thereupon issued a writ of fieri facias to the sheriff. To prevent
the latter from proceeding with the sale of the property seized
under authority of this writ, the judgment debtor unsuccessfully
sought an injunction from the trial court. Under its supervisory
jurisdiction, the supreme court held the writ of fieri facias a
nullity and prohibited further proceedings under the seizure.
Following an earlier case, the supreme court held that in such
cases the order permitting the appellee to execute on the judg-
ment appealed from must be obtained from the trial judge, rather
than from a clerk; that the proceedings in this respect were
judicial, rather than ministerial.
A case which may have some unfortunate effects, not from
the issue decided but rather from a dictum in the opinion, is
Reid v. Monticello.36 There the plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued
a grocer and his casualty insurance carrier to recover damages
for personal injuries sustained by the wife, and for the recovery
of medical expenses paid by the husband, as a result of the wife's
fall over a wire rack alleged to have been placed negligently in
the store. These two defendants answered, denying any negli-
gence on the part of the owner or his employees, and in the alter-
native pleading that the accident was caused solely through the
negligence of the plaintiff wife. Thereafter, alleging that a sec-
ond insurance company had issued a policy covering the negli-
34. Arts. 588-590, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
35. 215 La. 423, 40 So. (2d) 806 (1949).
36. 215 La. 444, 40 So. (2d) 814 (1949).
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gence of the store-owner and his employees in the operation
of the store, plaintiffs made this latter insurance company a
party defendant. The second insurer's answer adopted both de-
fenses relied upon by the two original defendants, but further
pleaded a failure of the insured to give timely notice of the
accident and claim. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor
of plaintiffs and against the two original defendants only. By
a so-called "supplemental judgment" the trial judge rejected
plaintiffs' demands against the second insurer, holding the latter
exonerated through the assured's failure to give timely notice
of the accident. The two original defendants appealed from
both the original and the supplemental judgment, and the plain-
tiffs answered this appeal, praying for an increase in the judg-
ment against the two original defendants.
In the court of appeal, the second insurer moved to dismiss
the appeal taken by the two original defendants, insofar as it
affected plaintiffs' demands against the second insurer. This
motion to dismiss was maintained through an opinion3 7 some-
what difficult to follow. For the most part the intermediate ap-
pellate court cited and discussed cases supporting the settled rule
that a judgment appealed from cannot be modified with respect
to co-appellees. (Here, the two original defendants were not
appellees, but appellants). Probably the crux of the court of
appeal's position was the asserted inability to entertain appel-
lants' complaint with respect to their co-defendant, since "no
issue was contested or controverted nor was any issue between
them adjudicated by the judgment appealed from."38
Under a writ of review limited to this single issue of the
case, the supreme court reversed the decision of the intermediate
appellate court dismissing the appeal insofar as it affected the
second insurer. The organ of our highest court pointed out that
the ultimate judgment against the second insurer might ma-
terially affect the extent to which the insured might pass the
liability on to his insurers; and that even if the insured had not
been made a party defendant, as a "third party aggrieved.
'3 9
by any judgment rejecting the plaintiffs' demands against the
second insurer, the insured might have appealed the judgment.
Had the opinion of the supreme court gone no further than
this, it might have been approved unqualifiedly, but in answer-
37. Reid v. Monticello, 33 So. (2d) 760 (La. App. 1948).
38. 33 So. (2d) 760, 762.
39. Under Art. 571, La. Code of Practice of 1870:
1950]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. X
ing the second insurer's argument, the organ of the court used
the following language: 40
"While we accept the argument that the generally
accepted rule is that where a solidary judgment is sought
against two defendants as tort feasors, a judgment relieving
one of liability cannot be questioned on appeal taken by the
defendant cast in the judgment, the reasons therefor being
that each defendant is liable for the 'whole damage and the
injured party my sue either or both and neither had any
right as against the other, a study and analysis of the authori-
ties that are the basis of this jurisprudence will show that
they are neither apposite nor controlling here ... ." (Italics
supplied,)
This recognition by dictum of a rule announced heretofore
only by the court of appeal 4' may serve to extend appreciably
the hyper-technical decision of our supreme court in Aetna Life
Insurance Company v. De Jean.4
2
Supervisory Procedure
No cases of unusual importance on this subject were decided
by the supreme court during the past term. In two cases,48 the
rule was reiterated that the supreme court, under the writ of
review, would not modify the judgment under review favorably
to a litigant who had not applied for the reviewing writ. In a
third case,44 it was held that when the supervisory jurisdiction
of the supreme court was invoked to compel the trial judge to
issue an order of appeal, and the appeal was granted by the
40. 40 So. (2d) 814, 816.
41. Rumpf v. Callo, 16 La. App. 12, 132 So. 763 (1931); Thalheim v. Suh-
ren, 18 La. App. 46, 137 So. 874 (1931); Spanja v. Thibodaux Boiler Works,
37 So. (2d) 615 (La. App. 1948). The first two of these cases were decided
prior to the supreme court's decision in Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151
So. 208 (1933), holding that one of two joint tortfeasors cast by a solidary
judgment might enforce contribution against the other. The third case
relied strongly on the court of appeal decision in the instant case, which
was reversed by the supreme court.
Jones v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 35 So. (2d) 33 (La. App. 1948), which also
supports this view, was overruled expressly by the supreme court in the
instant case.
42. 185 La. 1074, 171 So. 450 (1936) noted in (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW
RWHEW 235, holding that contribution may not be enforced between joint tort-
feasors unless both are cast solidarily by the judgment. The dictum of the
instant case would appear to go further, and to hold that one joint tort-
feasor cast in judgment has no interest sufficient to permit him to appeal
from a judgment absolving another alleged joint tortfeasor.
43. Cassar v. Mansfield Lumber Co., 215 La. 533, 41 So. (2d) 209 (1949);
Osborne v. Mossler Acceptance Co., 214 La. 503, 38 So. (2d) 151 (1948).
44. State ex rel. Dowling v. Canal Bank & Trust Co., 214 La. 283, 87 So.
(2d) 709 (1948).
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trial judge in compliance with an alternative writ of mandamus,
the issue originally presented thereupon became moot. No prin-
ciple of Louisiana law permitted the supreme court to condemn
the trial judge personally for the costs of the proceedings.
The only new principle of law announced in this field re-
sulted from the decision in Jones v. Williams.45 In the trial
court plaintiff asserted alternatively claims for workmen's com-
pensation and for damages, there obtaining a judgment on his
primary demand. On appeal, the court of appeal reversed the
judgment, rejecting both of plaintiff's demands. A rehearing
was then applied for by plaintiff, which the intermediate appel-
late court granted in part, limiting the reconsideration solely
to the plaintiffs alternative demand for damages. On rehearing,
this demand of plaintiff's likewise was rejected, and plaintiff was
applied to the supreme court for a writ of review. Under the
pertinent constitutional provision, 46 an application to the supreme
court for a writ of review must be filed within thirty days of
the court of appeal's refusal to grant applicant a rehearing.
Though the application for the writ here was filed within thirty
days of the intermediate appellate court's refusal to grant a sec-
ond rehearing on plaintiff's claim for damages, it was filed more
than thirty days after the court of appeal refused to grant plain-
tiff a rehearing with respect to his demand for workmen's com-
pensation. Based on this latter fact, defendant contended in the
supreme court that the writ was not filed timely to permit con-
sideration of plaintiff's claim for workmen's compensation. This
contention was brushed aside by the supreme court, which stated
that the words "any case," as distinguished from any demand,
indicated a constitutional intent to have the delay commence
only through final action by the court of appeal.
Homestead Exemptions
Acosta v. Whitney National Bank of New Orleans47 reite-
rated the rule that the constitutional provisions 48 granting the
head of a family the right to have the family homestead exempt
from seizure were not self-operative. The heirs of the former
owner brought a petitory action to have their ownership of the
property in dispute recognized, alleging that the property was
sold at judicial sale for less than $4,000, in an action brought
45. 215 La. 1, 39 So. (2d) 746 (1949).
46. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 11.
47. 214 La. 700, 38 So. (2d) 391 (1948).
48. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XI, §§ 1-4.
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after their father's death to enforce a mortgage on the property.
The constitutional language "no court or ministerial officer of
this State shall ever have jurisdiction, or authority, to enforce
any judgment, execution, or decree,, against the property ex-
empted, as a homestead" 49 was asserted as a basis of the alleged
nullity of the judicial sale. Relying on an unbroken line of juris-
prudence, the court held that this language merely prohibited
the courts and ministerial officers from seizing a homestead
which had been judicially declared exempt from seizure from
the debt sought to be enforced. It was further pointed out that,
even with respect to the dependent wife and children of the
debtor, the homestead exemption is lost forever unless it is
claimed by the one entitled thereto at the time the property
is seized.
Two other cases on the subject form a striking contrast
aptly illustrating the social objective to be served by the home-
stead exemption. In one,50 a dependent widow, who continued
to live on the property, was permitted to assert the homestead
exemption, even against the children of her husband by a first
marriage. These children owned a half interest in the property
and sought to enforce against the other half interest a mortgage
given them by their father to secure amounts due them from
their mother's succession. In the other,5' a husband who sought
to use the homestead exemption as a screen to prevent the exe-
cution of a judgment in favor of his divorced wife for past-due
alimony for the support of herself and her child was held not
entitled to the exemption. From the evidence presented, the
court found that the husband had no one (other than his child
and divorced wife) dependent upon him for support. The court
rested its denial of the exemption on the ground that the latter
was granted primarily for the benefit of the dependent mem-
bers of the family. Any other decision would have permitted
the homestead exemption to have been used as a sword against
the very persons whom it was intended to serve as a shield.
Miscellaneous
Rhodes v. Collier,52 a possessory action, presented an in-
teresting application of established procedural principles. Plain-
tiffs' petition alleged, inter alia, that they had been in the real,
49. Id. at § 2.
50. Harrell v. Crow, 214 La. 548, 38 So. (2d) 226 (1948).
51. State ex rel. Code v. Code, 215 La. 485, 41 So. (2d) 62 (1949).
52. 215 La. 754, 41 So. (2d) 669 (1949).
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actual and corporeal possession of all of the land in dispute prior
to the disturbance through defendant's entry thereon. On the
trial, however, plaintiffs could show the corporeal possession
of only a portion of the land, relying upon the doctrine of civil
possession of the whole through physical possession of a part to
supplement their proof. Based on this, defendant argued strongly
that there was a discrepancy between pleading and proof. The
court swept this argument aside, holding that it was only incum-
bent upon plaintiffs to exhibit proof of possession, actual or con-
structive. The court again applied the settled rule that a defend-
ant in a possessory action, without color of title, could not de-
feat the possession of record owners who had corporeal posses-
sion of a part of the tract, except through an adverse possession
by inclosures.
In Lawrence v. Claiborne,53 plaintiff sued to be recognized
as the owner of certain property, alleging that defendant took
title to the property merely as agent for plaintiff's husband, since
deceased. An exception of no cause of action, levelled at plain-
tiff's attempt to prove title to property by parol, was maintained;
but plaintiff was granted leave to amend so as to declare upon
a counter-letter or other written evidence. By a supplemental
petition, plaintiff next alleged that defendant had acknowledged
in writing that he was her husband's agent, and annexed to her
pleading a memorandum book allegedly showing that defendant
had accounted to plaintiff's husband for collection of rents, taxes
paid and commissions charged by defendant. The defendant
again excepted, and simultaneously therewith filed an answer,
averring defendant's purchase of the property for his own ac-
count, but admitting an oral agreement to sell the property to
plaintiff's husband and the subsequent default of the latter
therein and cancellation of the agreement accordingly. On the
day of trial, defendant objected to the introduction of evidence
on the ground that plaintiff's petition disclosed no cause of action.
The exception and objection were maintained, plaintiff's demands
rejected,' and she appealed. In the supreme court, plaintiff relied
strongly on the admission in the defendant's answer of the oral
agreement to sell the property, contending that this constituted
sufficient written evidence. The court, however, held that these
allegations in defendant's answer could not be considered except
as answers to interrogatories to facts and articles; and as so con-
sidered, the allegations as to default by plaintiff's husband and
cancellation of the agreement could not be refuted by plaintiff.
53. 215 La. 785, 41 So. (2d) 680 (1949).
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Appeals from judgments rendered by courts of limited juris-
diction in Louisiana, in matters involving $100 or less, generally
are tried de novo in the appellate court. Scott v. Moore54 con-
sidered the procedure in such cases. In a New Orleans city court
plaintiff owner of certain property used summary proceedings
to evict the occupant from the premises, so that the owner and
his family might occupy the house. This action was dismissed
by the trial judge through the maintenance of defendant's excep-
tion of no cause of action. On appeal, the Orleans Court of
Appeal overruled the exception, and after a trial of the case
on its merits rendered judgment for plaintiff. As the case had
not been tried on the merits in the trial court, defendant under
a writ of review sought to have the supreme court set aside the
judgment on appeal and to have the case remanded to the court
of first instance for trial. Pointing out that a trial de novo was
a trial anew, the supreme court held that on such an appeal the
appellate court might pass on all questions presented, including
those relating to the merits, even though the case had been dis-
posed of by the trial court only on the exception.
54. 214 La. 1090, 39 So. (2d) 741 (1949).
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